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Recent Decisions
CIVIL PROCEDURE - IN PERSONAM ACTIONS AND THE
NONRESIDENT MOTORIST STATUTES
Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Company,
294 F.2d 641 (4th Cir. 1961)
A Texas resident permitted her son to drive her automobile to a
Marine base in North Carolina. The automobile was loaned to a fellow
Marine who fatally injured plaintiff's intestate. Suit was brought in a
North Carolina court against the nonresident owner, service of process
being in accordance with the state's nonresident motorist statute.' De-
fendant had notice of the suit, as did her insurance company, which
elected not to defend. Plaintiff recovered a default judgment for
$25,000.
In a supplementary proceeding against the insurance company five
years later, the plaintiff recovered the full amount of the insurance policy
plus interest on the default judgment. The insurance company appealed
on the ground that the default judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the nonresident owner. It was held that North Caro-
lina had personal jurisdiction over the nonresident automobile owner.2
The constitutionality of a nonresident motorist statute which gives
reasonable notice to the defendant is no longer questioned.! Litigation
has shifted from an attack on the jurisdictional basis of the statute to
questions concerning the proper construction of its terms.' Generally,
the state court in construing its statute will treat it as being in derogation
of the common law, and therefore will not extend it by implication to
persons falling outside its specific provisions.5 Almost all states now
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-105 (Supp. 1959). The statute provides that process may be
served on a nonresident in any action "'. . . growing out of any accident or collision in
which said nonresident may be involved by reason of the operation by him, for him, and
under his control or direction, express or implied, of a motor vehicle on such public high-
ways of this State .... "
2. Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 294 F.2d 641 (4th Cit. 1961).
3. Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933) (The nonresident motorist statute was extended to
a user with permission.); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). But see Wuchter v.
Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928) (Provision must be made for notifying motorists.). Eleven
years before Hess, in Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916), the Supreme Court sus-
tained a New Jersey statute which required actual appointment of a state official as the agent
of the nonresident motorist as a condition to using the highways of the state.
4. See generally Dambach, Personal Jurisdiction: Some Current Problems and Modern
Trends, 5 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 198, 199-211 (1958); Stumberg, Extension of Nonresident Motor-
ist Statute to Those Not Operators, 44 IOWA L. REv. 286 (1959).
5. See, e.g., Ray v. Richardson, 250 Ala. 705, 36 So. 2d 89 (1948); Chapman v. Davis,
233 Minn. 62, 45 N.W.2d 822 (1951); Harris v. Owens, 142 Ohio St. 379, 52 N.E.2d 522
(1943); In re Wilcox's Estate, 137 N.E.2d 301 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955); Pray v. Meier, 69
Ohio App. 141, 43 N.E.2d 318 (1942) (dissenting opinion). See also Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d
1164 (1957).
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have such statutes, but the class of nonresident motorists affected differs.'
By construing its statute as applying to an automobile owner who had
never come into the state personally but who had permitted another to
use her automobile there, the North Carolina court raised the question
whether an in personam judgment rendered in accordance with that in-
terpretation of a nonresident motorist statute would be constitutionally
valid.7
The United States Court of Appeals decided that a state's jurisdiction
may extend to such a nonresident. The decision was based primarily up-
on the reasoning of International Shoe Company v. Washington.8 The
court also relied upon cases in areas other than automobile litigation
where the courts had re-examined the concepts underlying in personam
jurisdiction.9
6. See Note, 44 IowA L. REv. 384, 390-392 (1959), for listings of various nonresident
motorist statutes. Only Alaska seems to have no provision for substitute service on nonresi-
dent motorists. Arizona, California, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, New York, and Washington
have statutes which clearly allow for service to be made upon nonresident owners who have
consented to the use of the car by another. Auz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-502 (1956); CAL.
VEHcLE CODE § 404 (Supp. 1957); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 47.29 (Supp. 1960); IowA CODE
ANN. § 321.499(3) (Supp. 1960); MftcH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2103 (1960); N.Y. VEmcLE &
TRAFFIc LAW § 253; WAsH. IREv. CODu § 46.64.040 (Supp. 1959).
See Oio REv. CODE § 2703.20 (Supp. 1961), which provides that process may be
served on "Any nonresident of this state, being the operator or owner of any motor vehicle,
who accepts the privilege extended by the laws of this state to nonresident operators and
owners, of operating a motor vehicle or of having the same operated, within this state...."
Cf. Parr v. Gregg, 70 Ohio App. 235, 42 N.E.2d 922 (1942) (The legislature designed the
term to apply only to persons actually controlling the driving and steering mechanism.);
Taylor v. Hall, 103 Ohio App. 283, 145 N.E.2d 241 (1956) (The statute was not restricted
to nonresidents who caused accidents while operating the motor vehicle. Here, nonresidents
injured a passing pedestrian by opening the cab door of a parked truck across the plaintiff's
path.)
7. No cases have been found directly supporting such an extended construction of this type
of statute. But see Ewing v. Thompson, 233 N.C. 564, 65 S.E.2d 17 (1951) (The family
purpose doctrine was employed to sustain service on a nonresident owner who had not been
personally present in the state.); Cf. Kentucky v. Maryland Cas. Co., 112 F.2d 352 (6th Cir.
1940) (The court refused to allow service on nonresident aunt of minor driver because facts
alleged did not bring the automobile within the family purpose doctrine.). Some courts have
allowed service upon nonresident owners by using agency or employer-employee theories.
See Smith v. Christian, 124 F. Supp. 201 (W.D. Mo. 1954); Lamere v. Franklin, 149 Misc.
371, 267 N.Y.S. 310 (Sup. Ct. 1933). Other courts have refused to allow an extension of
nonresident motorist statutes to nonresident owners. See Larsen v. Powell, 117 F. Supp. 239
(D. Colo. 1953); Wilson v. Hazard, 145 F. Supp. 23 (D. Mass. 1956); Dalton v. Alex-
ander, 10 Ill. App. 2d 273, 135 NXE.2d 101 (1956); Zimmerman v. First Judicial Dist.
Court, 332 P.2d 654 (Nev. 1958).
8. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Although this case involved a foreign corporation defendant,
there is a general agreement among the law review writers that the Supreme Court's observa-
tions concerning the basis for judicial jurisdiction in personam were intended to apply as well
to nonresident natural persons. See note 11 infra.
9. E.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) (domicile as basis of jurisdiction);
Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935) (nonresident's agent selling
securities within the state); Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957) (single
tortious act within the state).
Dubin v. City of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (Phila. County Ct. 1938), noted in
87 U. PA. L. REV. 119 (1938), was also cited. Here, the Pennsylvania court held that own-
ership of realty within the forum is a basis for in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident.
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International Shoe qualified the inflexible rule of Pennoyer v. Neff'
that personal service within the state is absolutely necessary for an in
personam judgment against a nonresident. It authorized the use of sub-
stituted service in obtaining in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corpo-
ration" whenever the corporation has sufficient contact or ties with the
forum to make it reasonable and just according to the "traditional con-
cepts of fair play and substantial justice" to do so.2
The application of this reasoning to the controlling circumstances of
the principal case would seem to justify the result.3 Here, the nonresi-
dent owner voluntarily sent her automobile into the state. This act out-
side of the state had direct and foreseeable consequences within the
forum. 4 The resultant injury was witnessed by North Carolina residents
Nonresident motorist statues, of course, permit the exercise of jurisdiction over owners of
automobiles under certain circumstances but the basis of this jurisdiction is not the mere
ownership of the personalty. On the question of whether judicial acceptance of a nonresi-
dent due to his relation to real property within the state might allow for a further extension
of jurisdiction based upon relationships to tangible personal property, see Note, 44 IowA L.
REV. 374 (1959). The author there states: "One objection might be based upon the patent
difference between personal and real property - the lack of permanence of the personalty.
It is perishable, but more important, it can be moved from one jurisdiction to another. But
is there a logical reason for making permanency a criterion here? We assume that at the
moment the cause of action arises the personalty is extant and present within the jurisdiction.
If he was not responsible for its original location there, the nonresident, at least, has chosen
to associate himself with the property located within the jurisdiction. Should he not be
required to answer within this jurisdiction for the injurious consequences of the personalty
being present to the same extent as if it had been realty? It would only seem just that he do
so." Supra, at 381-82.
10. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). See also McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917), where
the court said: "The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power .... "
Some writers have proposed restricting, if not abrogating, "transient" jurisdiction. See
Ehrenzwig, CONFLICT OF LAWs, 102-06 (1959); Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal
Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L. J. 289 (1956).
11. See Note, BROOKLYN L. REv. 291, 293-99 (1958), for a detailed analysis of the Inter-
national Shoe opinion which indicates that the concepts apply equally to natural persons. See
also Cleary & Seder, Extended jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois Courts, 50 Nw. U.L. REV.
599, 603 (1955); Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer Is Dead - Long Live Pennoyer, 30 ROcKY MT.
L. REV. 285, 287 (1958); Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Basis
of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. REV. 249, 251 (1959).
"One argument against applying International Shoe to individuals or for applying it dif-
ferently is that the decision's contacts - interest approach flows from the states' traditional
power to exclude foreign corporations or to condition their entrance upon submission to
broad extraterritorial jurisdiction. Some courts have accepted this rationale and have reasoned
that the absence of power to exclude individuals precludes the imposition of similarly broad
jurisdiction and requires a stronger state interest before jurisdiction over natural persons
may be asserted ....
"A more reasonable objection is based on the ease of application of the established juris-
dictional tests for natural persons ....
"If the interest analysis is to be applied to natural persons, it should be applied with
greater restraint than in the case of corporations." Note, 73 HARe. L. REV. 909, 935-36 (1960).
12. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
13. It is not necessary in all cases that the act be done in the state; the causing of reasonably
foreseeable consequences in the state may be grounds for the granting of jurisdiction. See
Reese & Galston, Doing An Act or Causing Consequences as Basis of Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA
L. REV. 249, 260-64 (1959).
14. In some situations, there would seem to be sufficient state and plaintiff interests to
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and is one to which North Carolina substantive law would apply.15 In
balancing such factors against claims of inconvenience to the nonresident
owner,"0 the assertion of jurisdiction would not violate the "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."' 7  The nonresident owner
allowed property capable of inflicting serious injury to be taken into an-
other state."8 The court concluded that this may fairly be coupled with
an obligation upon the owner to stand suit where the property has been
taken with her consent.
This decision dearly extends a state's in personam jurisdiction from
a situation where the nonresident motorist commits a tortious act' with-
in the state, to a situation where a non-tortious act done beyond the state's
render the application of a statute covering such a case constitutional. See Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 I. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). Here, in a
suit by an Illinois resident for injuries sustained when a water heater exploded, the Supreme
Court of Illinois held that an Ohio corporation, which manufactured a safety valve that was
assembled in Pennsylvania into the heater purchased by the plaintiff in Illinois, was subject
to the jurisdiction of the Illinois courts.
In Heliriegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 157 F. Supp. 718, 721 (N.D. Il. 1957), although
an opposite result was reached on a similar factual situation, the decision in the Gray case
was predicted in dictum. But cf. Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc. 239 F.2d
502 (4th Cir. 1956), where a North Carolina statute was held unconstitutional when ap-
plied to the particular transaction before the court, which was an action against a nonresident
corporation who shipped defective goods directly into the state. See also Sobeloff, Jurisdiction
of State Courts Over Nonresidents in Our Federal System, 43 CORliLL LQ. 196 (1957).
15. Both North Carolina and Texas courts would have applied North Carolina law under
the rule that the law of the place where the accident occurred governs. Goode v. Barton, 238
N.C. 492, 497, 78 S.E.2d 398, 402 (1953). See T:x. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 4678
(1952).
16. The factors which a court will consider before it will allow a dismissal of a case within
its jurisdiction because of inconvenience to the litigant are "the relative ease of access to
sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost
of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; possibility of view of premises . . . ; and all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive." Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
In the ordinary case, it would be possible to alleviate extreme hardships to a defendant
by a removal to a federal court on the ground of diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 14441
(1958). A motion could then be made for a change of venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404 (a) (1958). The principle of forum non conveniens may also be applicable in
some state courts. See Bata v. Bata, 304 N.Y. 151, 105 NXE.2d 623 (1952).
17. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
18. To extend this line of reasoning beyond the area of nonresident motorist litigation
might prove dangerous. "... . the property basis could constitutionally be extended to cover
physical injuries arising from tangible personalty present within the state. However, the
relationship between the defendant and the state created by his leaving a piece of personal
property within its borders, in contrast to the permanent realty, seems too tenuous to allow
the mere presence of that property within the state to be a sufficient basis for other actions in
personam against the absent non-resident." Note, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 948 (1960).
19. Since the initial Supreme Court approval of a single act as a basis of jurisdiction in Hess
v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), the problem which faces the courts most often is
whether an employer or personal representative of a driver, or an owner of an automobile, is
subject to suit under a nonresident motorist statute which does not explicitly extend coverage
to him. Some courts have been hesitant in allowing such an extension. See O'Tier v. Sell,
252 N.Y. 400, 169 NE. 624 (1930) (This case required that the nonresident personally
operate the vehicle.).
